INTRODUCTION
A great deal of attention has been paid recently to repeated games with bounded complexity. References [3, 5, 63 and others deal with repeated games played by automata. In this case the set of strategies is reduced to the set of those strategies that can be realized by automata.
Here we address ourselves to repeated games played by players with bounded recall who do not know the stage in which they are currently playing. In other words, we restrict ourselves to stationary r-bounded recall (t-SBR) strategies, according to which at each stage when he decides about his action a player may rely only on the t previous signals he has received (see [l] and [2] ). Moreover, his decision is not time dependent.
First, we consider zero-sum games which are played sequentially infinitely many times, where player 1 uses t,-SBR strategies and player 2 uses t,-SBR strategies. These games are of a finite type and they have a value, denoted by V,,, ,?. We investigate the asymptotic behavior of I',,,,, when t, and t, grow to infinity.
Assume, for example, that two players play a zero-sum game,where the actions set of player i, denoted by Zi, contains only two actions, i = 1, 2. Assume furthermore that this game is played repeatedly, and that player 2 (the minimizer) is restricted to I-SBR strategies. Namely, player 2's strategy is a function cp from JC1', x C2 to Z,. When player 2 chooses such a function cp, he has to play cp(a,, a2) if he has observed (a,, az) at the previous stage. 130 It is readily shown (see proof of Theorem 2) that if player 1 has lOObounded recall he can learn about the function cp that has been chosen by player 2 during the game. Consequently, at each stage player 1 can play his best response and thus ensure himself the minmax (with pure stragegies) payoff. Now assume that player 2 increases his ability to remember. The question is: How fast does player 1 have to increase his memory capacity in order to preserve his advantage?
The first result is that if t, is a function oft,, say 1, =S(t,), if t, > tz, and if logf(t)/t tends to zero when t goes to infinity, then V,,.,, tends to the value of the one-shot game. This means that the "stronger" player has no advantage in the long run, if his memory capacity grows less than exponentially as a function of his opponent's memory capacity. This result is similar to that of [3] , which deals with finite automata. An immediate consequence of this result is that if a non-zero sum game is played by the above players, the set of Nash-equilibrium payoffs tends to the set of all the individually rational and feasible payoffs. This result is described formally in Theorem 4.
The second and the third results are of the following form. If the "stronger" player (here the maximizer) increases his memory capacity exponentially as a function of the other player's memory capacity, theri the value of the repeated game is the minmax (with pure strategies) of the oneshot game. This means that in the exponential growth case, the "stronger" player produces the maximum which he can expect from his advantage.
DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
A two-player zero-sum game consists of two action sets Z', and C, and a payoff function h: C, x Z:, -+ '8. Denote this game by G(Z, , C,, h).
Denote Z= Z, x C,. DEFINITION. Let ti be an integer. A pure stationary ti-bounded recall (ti-SBR) strategy of player i is a pair (e, cp), where (1) e is the initial memory, e E ,I", and (2) cp is a function, cp: ,?I;" + Xi.
By the following observation, notice that a ti-SBR strategy is in particular a stragey in the repeated game, which is a sequence (cpl, cpZ, . ..) of functions, where cp, + , : C' + Cj for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Fix a ti-SBR strategy (x, cp), x = (X,) . ..) x,) E C". For each 0 <t < ti-1 and (J?~, . . . . y,)~ C', define CP~+~(Y~, . . . . y,)= (P(x~+,, . . . . x,,,yl, . . . . y,) and for each rj< t and (?I lr...,~,)~Cr, define (P,+~(Y,,...,Y~)=(P(Y~-,,+ ,,. ..,. v,) .
Denote the set of all t,-SBR strategies of player i by Sir.
x is a word if XE Ck for some integer k. Let x and y be words, and xy will denote concatenation of x and y into one word. If x = (x,, . . . . ?ck) is a word and j< k -n + 1, then ,u(j,j + n -1) will denote the subword fxj3 x~ + 1 3 ...) wxj + n ~ 1).
Let z = (e, cp) and CT = (e', $) be two pure strategies in Sl,l and in S;Z, respectively. r and CT determine a string of payoffs (a,(r, 0))~~ , , in the following way: Denote by z, the signal (q(e), $(e')): U,(L 0) = Mz, 1. Denote by zZ the signal ((p(e(2, t,) , zI) ll/(e(2, f2), zi)):
and so on.
Define now the payoff function H: S;l x SF -+ '%, as 
DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME IN WORDS
A zero-sum G(C,, Z;,, h) is played repeatedly many times. After every stage each player is informed about the actions of his opponent at that stage. In case a player has t-finite recall he remembers this last signal and he forgets the signals he got (t + 1) stages before (first in first out). A player can rely on his memory when he chooses his action at the next stage. A strategy is said to be stationary if its choice is independent of the stage of the game. At the first stage of the game a player adopts an initial memory, that is, e E (Z, x .X2)', on which he will rely during the first t stages.
Assume now that player i had t;-bounded recall, i= 1,2. Let T = (e, cp) E Sy and c = (e', $) E ST. At the first stage player 1 will play cp(e) and player 2 will play Il/(e'). At the first stage player 2 (the minimizer) has to pay a,(r, g) = h(cp(e), $(e')) to player 1. After stage 1 the players remember the signal Z, = (q(e), $(e')) and forget the first item of their memory, i.e., player 1 forgets e, and player 2 forgets e;. Now, the memories of player 1 and player 2 are (e(2, t,), zl) and (e'(2, tz), cl), respectively. The moves that will be made at the second stage are rp(e(2, t, ), z, ) for player 1 and ll/(e'(2, tz), zl) for player 2. The signal is now z2= (q(e(2, t,), z,), ti(e'(2, f2) z,)) and th e payoff is a,(~, cr) = h(~~), and so on. The payoff of the repeated game is the Cesaro limit of a,, a2, . . . .
A mixed strategy is defined, as usual, as a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies. If pi is a probability distribution over SF, i = 1, 2, then we define WP,, PA = J?&,,,~~, (H(z, a)), which is the expectation, with respect to the distribution induced by ( pl, pz), of H.
The game G,,.,, is of a finite type (i.e., Sy and S;* are finite). Thus the existence of its value is ensured by the Minmax Theorem.
Putting it precisely, there exists a number I',,.,? such that
where the maximum is taken over all the probability distributions p, over Sl,', and the minimum is taken over all the probability distributions pz over $2. 
There is a constant c, depending on G, such that V,,, = W, and player 1 can achieve it by adopting a pure strategy. Let x= (x,, . . . . xk) be a word. x has an n-cycle if there are two integers t<t'<k such that x(t, t+n-l)=x(t', t'+n-1), wherej>k is identified with j (mod k). For each n player 2 constructs an n-SBR strategy by the following way. He generates a finite sequence of i.i.d random variables (the length of which is a function of the recalls of both players) using his optimal strategy in the one-shot game. To each sequence with no cycle is associated a pure SBR strategy. Proposition 1 shows that this can be done with high probability. Proposition 3 is then used to prove that the recall of player 1 is too small to allow correlation with player 2's moves, hence the result.
In 133 player 2 generates n i.i.d. random variables with the same distribution as above, one for each state. To each sequence is associated an automaton with n states. 5 . PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Some notations from Information
Theory must be introduced before proceeding to the proof. Let X be a finite random variable (f.r.v) that ranged to (x,, . . . . x,}. Define the entropy of X to be 
5.2.
The strategy defined below is defined as if the information of player 2 is trivial. Namely, that after each stage player 2 gets information only about his action and not about his opponent's action. Such a strategy can be easily modified in order to get a strategy of standard information, without losing its "good" properties.
In the case where player 2 has a pure optimal strategy in the one-shot game, then the result is obvious.
Fix and n and let k =n3f(n). Now, let X,, X,, . . . . X, be a sequence of mutually independent identically distributed random variables, which are defined on the sample space Q and range to zz. Assume that prob(X, =s)=p,, for all SEAR, where p= (p,, . . ..p.) ~d (C~) satisfies V= Max ycd,l,, h(q, p). We can assume that the optimal strategy is not pure so k . c,(k) -+ 0.
Define the event A = (w E Q I (X,(w), . ..( X,(o) ) has no n-cycles}.
For every o E A define e(w) = (X,-,,+ i(w), . . . . X,(w)). cp(a,)(X,(w)), . . . . x t+n-I(w))= (X,+1(~), -**7 Xi+,Jo)), i= 1, . . . . k, where t > k is identified with t (mod k). On all the remaining tuples of J?j, q(w) is defined arbitrarily. Denote this mixed strategy by 6. 5.3 . Let Sz' be the sample space A, with the probability prob' ( .) Define Xi = X, on A. for every D z A. ProoJ See the Appendix. 1 5. 4 . Assume ' that the payoff function h is non-negative, and let r = (e', II/) be a pure strategy of player 1. Hence,
Inequalities (6) and (7) lead to the conclusion that H(r, a) < M( l/n + 25( l/n) + c,) + V.
The first term tends to zero as n + cc. In order to conclude the proof of Theorem 1 we can use the previous procedure, exchanging the roles of the players. ' Obviously there is no loss of generality in this assumption, and it is taken for the sake of simplicity. 5.5 Remark. Actually, the proof proves more than desired. It is not assumed that the strategy of player 1 is stationary ( Yi is defined to be the action of player 1 at stage tk + i). Thus, by using t, player 2 can ensure v (at the limit), even that his opponent does not use SBR strategies, but rather BR strategies, which can be time dependent.
In the non-zero-sum case, the two players can agree to act on any cooperative action. Since V,Cnj,n -+ V, each player has a threat to his opponent, by which he forces the opponent not to deviate from the cooperative action. Thus, if (C,, C,, h,, h2) is a non-zero-sum game and NfC,,,, is the set of Nash-equilibrium payoffs when players 1 and 2 use n-SBR andf(n)-SBR strategies, respectively, then N,-(,),, tends to the set of all the individually rational and feasible payoffs. In order to demonstrate it precisely we need the following notations.
Notations.
(i) Let iE { 1,2).
(ii) (x,, x2) E !R2 is individually rational if X, > d, and x2 k d,.
(iii) h = (h,, h2).
(iv) XE 5R2 is feasible if x~conv h(Z), i.e., x is contained in the convex hull of all the payoffs.
(v) FIR= {.xE%~ ( x is feasible and individually rational}.
Let {A,} be a sequence of subsets of !R2. We denote by lim A, the set {x ( there is a sequence x, E A, such that lim x, = x}. In order to prove the inverse inclusion we will describe two strategies, one for each player, consisting of two plans: the master plan and the punishment plan. The punishment plan will be executed in a case where a deviation had occurred. However, we have to take care that the histories used in the master plan (in order to achieve a cooperative payoff) do not interfere with the one that could appear in the punishment plan.
Assume first that int FIR # 0. We will use as punishing strategies the same kind of strategies as described in the previous proof and assume that they have n/2 or f(n)/2 memory and induce histories with no iMin{n, f(n)} cycles. Denote u(n) = [Min{n, f(n)}/6].
By using histories with u(n)-cycles we will achieve (at the limit) any cooperative payoff in int FIR. Let x E int FIR. x = C, E z cr,h(a), where a,>0 and Ca,= 1. Since u(n)-tn+cc co, for each E >O there are integers n and j,, ~EC, so that cj, = u(n) and /Ix -xUez (j,/u(n)) h(a)ll~ <E. It means that we can get x as a limit of rational combinations of the payoffs.
Denote C = (u' , . . . . alzl } and for each 1 <k< JCJ, uk = (at, u';) . The master plan for player i is defined as follows. Play u,' for j,, times, then play of for j,, times and so on till a, IzI Then again play uf for j,~ times and so . on. It is obvious that this strategy can be implemented by 6u(n)-SBR strategy.
We will describe the punishment plan of player 2. A similar description holds for player 1. The punishment plan uses n/2-SBR. Denote by CJ = (x, cp) the strategy of player 2 that was described in the previous proof, for n/2-bounded recall (not n-bounded recall). Immediately after observing a deviation, player 2 plays according to the initial memory of CJ. That is, he plays x, then .x2 and so on for n/2 stages (X = (x,, . . . . x,,~)). Notice that after these n/2 stages the memory of player 2 still contains a u(n)-cycle and also the deviation. From the moment in which the terminal n/Zword that appears in player 2's memory coincides with a possible n/2-history of the punishment strategy rr, player 2 continues playing according to (T. By this description it is ensured that from the 42 + 1st stage after the deviation on, player 2 plays according to cr.
Since x E int FIR, and by Theorem 1, the pair of strategies described above is a Nash equilibrium.
We have got that int FIR E lim NfC,,,., and since lim Nf(,,,, is a closed set we have FIR z lim N,(,,.,) .
The case where int FIR = @ is much more simpler, and we leave it to the reader. 1
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The main idea of the proof is the following. After each n-word that already appears in his memory player 1 knows the next move of player 2, and thus he can play a one-shot game best reply. Since player l's recall is much bigger than that of his opponent's he can learn more and more about player 2's moves, and thus ensure himself at least W for longer and longer sequences of stages. It is proved that from a certain stage there is an n-cycle in which player 1 knows all player 2's moves.
Let c = ICI2 + 1, and let b = cn. The pure strategy t = (e, cp) will be described as follows. e is an arbitrary tuple of Cb. For any ZEE' denote r(z) = z(b -n + 1, b), i.e., t(z) is the last n-subword of z. Now define q(z) arbitrarily if t(z) appears only once in z. And define q(z) to be the best response of player 1 against zg, where z(k -n, k -1) is the antecedent appearance of t(z) to z(b -n + 1, b), and zk = (zk, z:).
In any string z of length b there is at least one n-subword, which appears t = ICI" times. Denote one of these n-subwords by u(z). Let ~7 = (e', I/I) be a pure strategy of player 2. Denote by z the memory of player 1 at stage 6, when player 1 plays t and player 2 plays (r, and denote (ur , . . . . II,) = r = U(Z). After the first appearance of u player 1 knows $(u). Denote by B($(o)) the best response of player 1 agains $(u), and by or the pair (B($(u)), $(r)). After the second appearance of o player 2 knows Ic/ (u,, . . . . u,, ol) . Let B(ll/(u,, . . . . u,, wr) ) be the best response of player 1 against it, and so on. After the IZI"-th appearance of v the memory of player 1 will contain the word z' = (vr, . . . . v,, CO,, . . . . CO!) , which satisfies the following. For every (n + 1 )-subword of z', I'= (?I,, . . . . y,, .vn Player 2 can easily ensure himself W, so the proof is complete.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let T be the strategy of player 1 described in the previous section, and let cr be any pure strategy of player 2. We shall show that the number of n-words that do not appear at least two times in a long sequence is small, and hence their relative weight for the payoff is negligible when n is sufficiently large.
Divide the set of stages into blocks B, = (1, . . . . g(n) d"}, B, = (g(n) d" + 1, . . . . 2g(n) d"), and so on. Fix an integer t. We shall evaluate C;, B, ui(r, a). Denote by -7, the pair of actions played at stage i, Z'E B,, and by z the g(n) d"-word (z,(,,,~, z,~(,+,~+ 1, . . . . z(,+,,~.,+,~-~) . Let, for each integer j, k, be the number of n-words appearing j times in the word -?. We have f jk.,=g(n)d"-n+ 1 and xkj<d". /=I Now, if for in B, the n-subword of z, which terminates at zi-1, has already appeared in 2, then player 1 gets at least W at the stage i. There are C (j -1) kj such stages. So,
where M is the largest absolute value of the payoffs in the game. Hence, lim inf Vg,njdn,n > W.
Since player 
Combine (3) and (4) in order to get .n(p2+q2)""+5(p2+qZ)i2.
Since (p'+ q2) < 1, by (2) and (5) If, contrary to the proposition, at least [k/n] i's satisfy Z ( Y, x, ) . . . . xi-r I z;) > l/n, then we would get that l/n .k/n = n3f(n)/n2 = nf(n) is less thanf(n) log d + 1 for infinitely many n's. However nf(n)/(f(n) log d + 1) + co, and thus the proof is complete. 
